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Abstract. Since the original publication of Martin Hellman’s cryptan-
alytic time-memory trade-off, a few improvements on the method have
been suggested. In all these variants, the cryptanalysis time decreases
with the square of the available memory. However, a large amount of
work is wasted during the cryptanalysis process due to so-called “false
alarms”. In this paper we present a method of detection of false alarms
which significantly reduces the cryptanalysis time while using a minute
amount of memory. Our method, based on “checkpoints”, reduces the
time by much more than the square of the additional memory used,
e.g., an increase of 0.89% of memory yields a 10.99% increase in per-
formance. Beyond this practical improvement, checkpoints constitute a
novel approach which has not yet been exploited and may lead to other
interesting results. In this paper, we also present theoretical analysis
of time-memory trade-offs, and give a complete characterization of the
variant based on rainbow tables.
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1 Introduction
Many cryptanalytic problems can be solved in theory using an exhaustive search
in the key space, but are still hard to solve in practice because each new instance
of the problem requires to restart the process from scratch. The basic idea of a
time-memory trade-off is to carry out an exhaustive search once for all such that
following instances of the problem become easier to solve. Thus, if there are N
possible solutions to a given problem, a time-memory trade-off can solve it with
T units of time and M units of memory. In the methods we are looking at T is
proportional to N2/M2 and a typical setting is T =M = N2/3.
The cryptanalytic time-memory trade-off has been introduced in 1980 by
Hellman [8] and applied to DES. Given a plaintext P and a ciphertext C, the
problem consists in recovering the key K such that C = SK(P ) where S is
an encryption function assumed to follow the behavior of a random function.
Encrypting P under all possible keys and storing each corresponding ciphertext
allows for immediate cryptanalysis but needs N elements of memory. The idea of
a trade-off is to use chains of keys. It is achieved thanks to a reduction function
R which generates a key from a ciphertext. Using S and R, chains of alternating
ciphertexts and keys can thus be generated. The key point is that only the first
and the last element of each chain are stored. In order to retrieve K, a chain is
generated from C. If at some point it yields a stored end of chain, then the entire
chain is regenerated from its starting point. However, finding a matching end of
chain does not necessarily imply that the key will be found in the regenerated
chain. There exist situations where the chain that has been generated from C
merges with a chain that is stored in the memory which does not contains K.
This situation is called a false alarm. Matsumoto, with Kusuda [10] in 1996
and with Kim [9] in 1999, gave a more precise analysis of the parameters of the
trade-off. In 1991, Fiat and Naor [6, 7] showed that there exist cryptographically
sound one-way functions that cannot be inverted with such a trade-off.
Since the original work of Hellman, several improvements have been pro-
posed. In 1982, Rivest [5] suggested an optimization based on distinguished points
(DP) which greatly reduces the amount of look-up operations which are needed
to detect a matching end point in the table. Distinguished points are keys (or
ciphertexts) that satisfy a given criterion, e.g., the last n bits are all zero. In
this variant, chains are not generated with a given length but they stop at the
first occurrence of a distinguished point. This greatly simplifies the cryptanal-
ysis. Indeed, instead of looking up in the table each time a key is generated
on the chain from C, keys are generated until a distinguished point is found
and only then a look-up is carried out in the table. If the average length of
the chains is t, this optimization reduces the amount of look-ups by a factor
t. Because merging chains significantly degrades the efficiency of the trade-off,
Borst, Preneel, and Vandewalle [4] suggested in 1998 to clean the tables by dis-
carding the merging and cycling chains. This new kind of tables, called perfect
table, substantially decreases the required memory. Later, Standaert, Rouvroy,
Quisquater, and Legat [14] dealt with a more realistic analysis of distinguished
points and also proposed an FPGA implementation applied to DES with 40-bit
keys. Distinguished points can also be used to detect collisions when a function
is iterated, as proposed by Quisquater and Delescaille [13], and van Oorschot
and Wiener [15].
In 2003, Oechslin [12] introduced the trade-off based on rainbow tables and
demonstrated the efficiency of his technique by recovering Windows passwords.
A rainbow table uses a different reduction function for each column of the table.
Thus two different chains can merge only if they have the same key at the same
position of the chain. This makes it possible to generate much larger tables.
Actually, a rainbow table acts almost as if each column of the table was a separate
single classic4 table. Indeed, collisions within a classic table (or a column of a
rainbow table) lead to merges whereas collisions between different classic tables
(or different columns of a rainbow table) do not lead to a merge. This analogy
can be used to demonstrate that a rainbow table of mt chains of length t has
4 By classic we mean the tables as described in the original Hellman paper.
the same success rate as t single classic tables of m chains of length t. As the
trade-off based on distinguished point, rainbow tables reduce the amount of
look-ups by a factor of t, compared to the classic trade-off. Up until now, trade-
off techniques based on rainbow tables are the most efficient ones. Recently, an
FPGA implementation of rainbow tables has been proposed by Mentens, Batina,
Preneel, and Verbauwhede [11] in order to retrieve Unix passwords.
Whether it is the classic Hellman trade-off, the distinguished points or the
rainbow tables, they all suffer from a significant quantity of false alarms. Contrar-
ily to what is claimed in the original Hellman paper, false alarms may increase
the time complexity of the cryptanalysis by more than 50%. We will explain this
point below. In this paper, we propose a technique whose goal is to reduce the
time spent to detect false alarms. It works with the classic trade-off, with dis-
tinguished points, and with rainbow tables. Such an improvement is especially
pertinent in practical cryptanalysis, where time-memory trade-offs are generally
used to avoid to repeat an exhaustive search many times. For example, when
several passwords must be cracked [12], each of them should not take more than
a few seconds. In [1], the rainbow tables are used to speed up the search pro-
cess in a special database. In such a commercial application, time is money, and
therefore any improvement of time-memory trade-off also.
In Section 2, we give a rough idea of our technique based on checkpoints.
We provide in Section 3 a detailed and formal analysis of the rainbow tables.
These new results allow to formally compute the probability of success, the
computation time, and the optimal size of the tables. Based on this analysis we
can describe and evaluate our checkpoint technique in detail. We illustrate our
method by cracking Windows passwords based on DES. In Section 4, we show
how a trade-off can be characterized in general. This leads to the comparison
of the three existing variants of trade-off. Finally, we give in Section 5 several
implementation tips which significantly improve the trade-off in practice.
2 Checkpoint Primer
2.1 False Alarms
When the precalculation phase is achieved, a table containing m starting points
S1, . . . , Sm and m end points E1, . . . , Em is stored in memory. This table can be
regenerated by iterating the function f , defined by f(K) := R(SK(P )), on the
starting points. Given a row j, let Xj,i+1 := f(Xj,i) be the i-th iteration of f on
Sj and Ej := Xj,t. We have:
S1 = X1,1
f→ X1,2 f→ X1,3 f→ . . . f→ X1,t = E1
S2 = X2,1
f→ X2,2 f→ X2,3 f→ . . . f→ X2,t = E2
...
...
Sm = Xm,1
f→ Xm,2 f→ Xm,3 f→ . . . f→ Xm,t = Em
In order to increase the probability of success, i.e., the probability that K ap-
pears in the stored values, several tables with different reduction functions are
generated.
Given a ciphertext C = SK(P ), the on-line phase of the cryptanalysis works
as follows: R is applied on C in order to obtain a key Y1, and then the function
f is iterated on Y1 until matching any Ej . Let s be the length of the generated
chain from Y1:
C
R→ Y1 f→ Y2 f→ . . . f→ Ys
Then the chain ending with Ej is regenerated from Sj until yielding the expected
key K. Unfortunately K is not in the explored chain in most of the cases. Such a
case occurs when R collides: the chain generated from Y1 merged with the chain
regenerated from Sj after the column where Y1 is. That is a false alarm, which
requires (t− s) encryptions to be detected.
Hellman [8] points out that the expected computation due to false alarms
increases the expected computation by at most 50 percent. This reasoning relies
on the fact that, for any i, f i(Y1) is computed by iterating f i times. How-
ever f i(Y1) should be computed from Yi because f i(Y1) = f(Yi). In this case,
the computation time required to reach a chain’s end is significantly reduced
on average while the computation time required to rule out false alarms stays
the same. Therefore, false alarms can increase by more than 50 percent the ex-
pected computation. For example, formulas given in Section 3 allow to determine
the computation wasted during the recovering of Windows passwords [12]: false
alarms increase by 125% the expected computation.
2.2 Ruling Out False Alarms Using Checkpoints
Our idea consists in defining a set of positions αi in the chains to be checkpoints.
We calculate the value of a given function G for each checkpoint of each chain
j and store these G(Xj,αi) with the end of each chain Xj,t. During the on-line
phase, when we generate Y1, Y2, . . . , Ys, we also calculate the values for G at each
checkpoint, yielding the values G(Yαi+s−t) . If Ys matches the end of a chain
that we have stored, we compare the values of G for each checkpoint that the
chain Y has gone through with the values stored in the table. If they differ at
least for one checkpoint we know that this is a false alarm. If they are identical,
we cannot determine if a false alarm will occur without regenerating the chain.
In order to be efficient, G should be easily computable and the storage of
its output should require few bits. Below, we consider the function G such that
G(X) simply outputs the less significant bit of X. Thus we have:
Pr{G(Xj,α) 6= G(Yα+s−t) | Xj,α 6= Yα+s−t} = 12
(
1− 1
2|K|
)
≈ 1
2
.
The case Xj,α 6= Yα+s−t occurs when the merge appears after the column α
(Fig 1). The caseXj,α = Yα+s−t occurs when eitherK appears in the regenerated
chain or the merge occurs before the column α (Fig. 2).
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Fig. 1. False alarm detected with proba-
bility 1/2
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Fig. 2. False alarm not detected
In the next section we will analyze the performances of perfect rainbow tables
in detail. Then, we will introduce the checkpoint concept in rainbow tables and
analyze both theoretical and practical results.
3 Perfect Rainbow Tables and Checkpoints
3.1 Perfect Tables
The key to an efficient trade-off is to ensure that the available memory is used
most efficiently. Thus we want to avoid the use of memory to store chains that
contain elements which are already part of other chains. To do so, we first gen-
erate more chains than we actually need. Then we search for merges and remove
chains until there are no merges. The resulting tables are called perfect tables.
They have been introduced by [4] and analyzed by [14]. Creating perfect rainbow
and DP tables is easy since merging chains can be recognized by their identical
end points. Since end points need to be sorted to facilitate the look-ups, identify-
ing the merges comes for free. Classic chains do not have this advantage. Every
single element of every classic chain that is generated has to be looked up in
all elements of all chains of the same table. This requires mt` look-ups in total
where ` is the number of stored tables. A more efficient method of generating
perfect classic tables is described in [2]
Perfect classic and DP tables are made of unique elements. In perfect rainbow
tables, no element appears twice in any given column, but it may appear more
than once across different columns. This is consistent with the view that each
column of a rainbow table acts like a single classic table. In all variants of the
trade-off, there is a limit to the size of the perfect tables that can be generated.
The brute-force way of finding the maximum number of chains of given length t
that will not merge is to generate a chain from each of the N possible keys and
remove the merges.
In the following sections, we will consider perfect tables only.
3.2 Optimal Configuration
From [12], we know that the success rate of a single un-perfect rainbow table is
1 −∏ti=1 (1− miN ) where mi is the number of different keys in column i. With
perfect rainbow tables, we have mi = m for all i s.t. 1 ≤ i ≤ t. The success rate
of a single perfect rainbow table is therefore
Prainbow = 1−
(
1− m
N
)t
. (1)
The fastest cryptanalysis time is reached by using the largest possible perfect
tables. This reduces the amount of duplicate information stored in the table and
reduces the number of tables that have to be searched. For a given chain length t,
the maximum number mmax(t) of rainbow chains that can be generated without
merges is obtained (see [12]) by calculating the number of independent elements
at column t if we start with N elements in the first column. Thus we have
mmax(t) = mt where m1 = N and mn+1 = N
(
1− e−mnN
)
where 0 < n < t.
For non small t we can find a closed form for mmax (see [2]):
mmax(t) ≈ 2N
t+ 2
.
From (1), we deduce the probability of success of a single perfect rainbow table
having mmax chains:
Pmaxrainbow = 1−
(
1− mmax
N
)t
≈ 1− e−tmmaxN ≈ 1− e−2 ≈ 86%.
Interestingly, for any N and for t not small, this probability tends toward a
constant value. Thus the smallest number of tables needed for a trade-off only
depends on the desired success rate P . This makes the selection of optimal
parameters very easy (see [2] for more details):
` =
⌈− ln(1− P )
2
⌉
, m =
M
`
, and t =
ln(1− P )
ln(1− M`N )`
≈ −N
M
ln(1− P ).
3.3 Performance of the Trade-Off
Having defined the optimal configuration of the trade-off, we now calculate the
exact amount of work required during the on-line phase. The simplicity of rain-
bow tables makes it possible to include the work due to false alarms both for
the average and the worst case.
Cryptanalysis with a set of rainbow tables is done by searching for the key in
the last column of each table and then searching sequentially through previous
columns of all tables. There are thus a maximum of `t searches. We calculate the
expectation of the cryptanalysis effort by calculating the probability of success
and the amount of work for each search k. When searching a key at position c
of a table, the amount of work to generate a chain that goes to the end of the
table is t − c. The additional amount of work due to a possible false alarm is c
since the chain has to be regenerated from the start to c in order to rule out the
false alarm. The probability of success in the search k is given below:
pk =
m
N
(
1− m
N
)k−1
. (2)
We now compute the probability of a false alarm during the search k. When
we generate a chain from a given ciphertext and look-up the end of the chain in
the table, we can either not find a matching end, find the end of the correct chain
or find an end that leads to a false alarm. Thus we can write that the probability
of a false alarm is equal to one minus the probability of actually finding the key
minus the probability of finding no end point. The probability of not finding an
end point is the probability that all points that we generate are not part of the
chains that lead into the end points. At column i, these are the mi chains that
we used to build the table. The probability of a false alarm at search k (i.e., in
column c = t− bk` c) is thus the following:
qc = 1− m
N
−
i=t∏
i=c
(
1− mi
N
)
(3)
where c = t− ⌊k` ⌋, mt = m, and mi−1 = −N ln(1− miN ). When the tables have
exactly the maximum number of chains mmax we find a short closed form for qc
(see [2] for more details):
qc = 1− m
N
− c(c+ 1)
(t+ 1)(t+ 2)
. (4)
The average cryptanalysis time is thus:
T =
k=`t∑
k=1
c=t−b k
`
c
pk (W (t− c− 1) +Q(c)) `+ (1− m
N
)`t (W (t) +Q(1)) ` (5)
where W (x) =
i=x∑
i=1
i and Q(x) =
i=t∑
i=x
qii.
The second term of (5) is the work that is being carried out every time no
key is found in the table while the first term corresponds to the work that is
being carried out during the search k.W represents the work needed to generate
a chain until matching a end point. Q represents the work to rule out a false
alarm. We can rewrite (5) as follows:
T =
k=`t∑
k=1
c=t−b k
`
c
pk
(
i=t−c−1∑
i=1
i+
i=t∑
i=c
qii
)
`+ (1− m
N
)`t
(
i=t∑
i=1
i+
i=t∑
i=1
qii
)
`
=
k=`t∑
k=1
c=t−b k
`
c
pk
(
(t− c)(t− c− 1)
2
+
i=t∑
i=c
qii
)
`+ (1− m
N
)`t
(
t(t− 1)
2
+
i=t∑
i=1
qii
)
`
We have run a few experiments to illustrate T . The results are given in Table 1.
Table 1. Calculated and measured performance of rainbow tables
N = 8.06× 1010, t = 10000,
m = 15408697, ` = 4
theory measured over 1000
experiments
encryptions (average) 1.55× 107 1.66× 107
encryptions (worst case) 2.97× 107 2.96× 108
number of false alarms (average) 1140 1233
number of false alarms (worst case) 26048 26026
3.4 Checkpoints in Rainbow Tables
From results of Section 3.3, we establish below the gain brought by the check-
points. We firstly consider only one checkpoint α. Let Y1 . . . Ys be a chain gen-
erated from a given ciphertext C. From (3), we know that the probability that
Y1 . . . Ys merges with a stored chain is qt−s. The expected work due to a false
alarm is therefore qt−s(t− s).
We now compute the probability that the checkpoint detects the false alarm.
If the merge occurs before the checkpoint (Fig. 2) then the false alarm cannot be
detected. If the chain is long enough, i.e., α+ s > t, the merge occurs after the
checkpoint (Fig. 1) with probability qα. In this case, the false alarm is detected
with probability Pr{G(Xj,α) 6= G(Yα+s−t) | Xj,α 6= Yα+s−t}.
We define gα(s) as follows:
gα(s) =

0 if there is no checkpoint in column α,
0 if (α+ s) ≤ t, i.e. the generated chain does not reach column α,
Pr{G(Xj,α) 6= G(Yα+s−t) | Xj,α 6= Yα+s−t} otherwise.
We can now rewrite Q(x) =
i=t∑
i=x
i (qi − qα · gα(t− i)) .
We applied our checkpoint technique with N = 8.06 × 1010, t = 10000,
m = 15408697, ` = 4 and G as defined in Section 2.2. Both theoretical and
experimental results are plotted on Fig. 3.
We can generalize to t checkpoints. We can rewrite Q(x) as follows:
Q(x) =
i=t∑
i=x
i
qi − qi · gi(t− i)− j=t∑
j=i+1
(
qj · gj(t− j)
k=j−1∏
k=i
(1− gk(t− k))
) .
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Fig. 3. Theoretical and experimental gain when one checkpoint is used
We now define memory cost and time gain. Let M , T , N and M ′, T ′, N ′ be
the parameters of two trade-offs respectively. We define σM and σT as follows:
M ′ = σM ·M and T ′ = σT · T.
The memory cost of the second trade-off over the first one is straightforwardly
defined by (σM−1) =M ′/M−1 and the time gain is (1−σT ) = 1−T ′/T . When
a trade-off stores more chains, it implies a memory cost. Given that T ∝ N2/M2
the time gain is:
(1− T
′
T
) = 1− 1
σ2M
.
Instead of storing additional chains, the memory cost can be used to store check-
points. Thus, given a memory cost, we can compare the time gains when the ad-
ditional memory is used to store chains and when it is used to store checkpoints.
Numerical results are given in Table 2.
The numerical results are amazing. An additional 0.89% of memory saves
about 10.99% of cryptanalysis time. This is six times more than the 1.76% of
gain that would be obtained by using the same amount of memory to store addi-
tional chains. Our checkpoints thus perform much better than the basic trade-off.
As we add more and more checkpoints, the gain per checkpoint decreases. In our
example it is well worth to use 6 bits of checkpoint values (5.35% of additional
memory) per chain to obtain a gain of 32.04%. The 0.89% of memory per check-
point are calculated by assuming that the start and the end of the chains are
stored in 56 bits each, as our example uses DES keys. As we explain in Section 5
the amount of bits used to store chain can be optimized and reduced to 49 bits
in our example. In this case a bit of checkpoint data adds 2% of memory and it
is still well worth using three checkpoints of one bit each to save 23% of work.
Table 2. Cost and gain of using checkpoint in password cracking, with N = 8.06×1010,
t = 10000, m = 15408697, and ` = 4
Number of checkpoints 1 2 3 4 5 6
Cost (memory) 0.89% 1.78% 2.67% 3.57% 4.46% 5.35%
Gain (time) storing chains 1.76% 3.47% 5.14% 6.77% 8.36% 9.91%
Gain (time) storing checkpoints 10.99% 18.03% 23.01% 26.76% 29.70% 32.04%
Optimal checkpoints 8935
± 5
8565
9220
± 5
8265
8915
9370
± 5
8015
8655
9115
9470
± 5
7800
8450
8900
9250
9550
± 50
7600
8200
8700
9000
9300
9600
± 100
4 Characterization and Comparison of Trade-Offs
In this section we give a generic way of characterizing the different variants of the
trade-off. We calculate the characteristic of rainbow tables exactly and compare
it to measured characteristics of other variants.
4.1 Time-Memory Graphs
Knowing how to calculate the success rate and the number of operations needed
to invert a function, we can now set out to plot the time-memory graphs. In
order to do so, we fix a given success rate and for each memory size we find
the table configuration that yields the fastest trade-off and plot the time that
it takes. The graphs show that cryptanalysis time decreases with the square
of the memory size, independently of the success rate. We can thus write the
time-memory relation as
T =
N2
M2
γ(P ) (6)
where γ(P ) is a factor that depends only on the success probability. It is inter-
esting to note that for P = 86% which is the the maximum success probability
of a single rainbow table, the factor is equal to 1. In that case we find the typical
trade-off which was already described by Hellman, namely that M = T = N
2
3 .
Note that this simple expression of the trade-off performance was not possible
for the previous variants. In those cases, calculations were always based on non-
perfect tables, on the worst case (the key is not found in any table) and ignoring
the amount of work due to false alarms. Optimizations have been proposed
with these limitations, but to our knowledge the actual average amount of work,
including false alarms has never been used to find optimal parameter. Our simple
formula allows for a very simple calculation of the optimal parameters when any
two of the success rate, the inversion time or the memory are given.
1e-08
1e-07
1e-06
1e-05
0.0001
0.001
0.01
0.1
1
10
1e-06 1e-05 0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.1 1
T/
N
M/N
10%
20%
50%
86%
90%
99%
99.9%
Fig. 4. Time-Memory graphs for rainbow tables, with various success rates.For
Prainbow = 86% the graph follows exactly T = N
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4.2 The Time-Memory Characteristic
The previous section confirms that rainbow tables follow the same T ∝ N2/M2
relation as other variants of the trade-off. Still, they seem to perform better.
We thus need a criterion to compare the trade-offs. We propose to use γ(P ) as
the trade-off characteristic. The evolution of γ over a range of P shows how a
variant is better than another. Figure 5 shows a plot of γ(P ) for rainbow tables:
In the following sections, we compare the performance of rainbow tables with
the performance of classic tables and DP tables. DP tables are much harder to
analyze because of the variable length of the chains. We will thus concentrate
on classic tables first.
4.3 Classic and DP Tables
The trade-off using classic or DP tables can also be characterized using the γ
factor. Indeed both trade-offs follow the T ∝ N2/M2 relation in a large part
of the parameter space up to a factor which depends of the success rate and
the type of trade-off. We have first devised a strategy to generate the largest
possible perfect tables for each variant of the trade-off and have then used as
many tables as necessary to reach a given success rate. The details of this work
and the resulting time-memory graphs are available in [2]. In Figure 6 we show
the evolution of the trade-off characteristic of classic tables and of DP tables.
The experiments and analysis show that rainbow tables outperform classic
tables and DP tables for success rates above 80%. Below this limit, perfect
classic tables are slightly better than perfect rainbow tables in terms of hash
operations needed for cryptanalysis. However, the price of using classic tables is
that they need t times more table look-ups. Since these do not come for free in
most architectures (content addressable memory could be an exception), rainbow
tables seem to be the best option in any case.
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5 Implementation Tips
For the sake of completeness we want to add some short remarks on the optimized
implementation of the trade-offs. Indeed, an optimized implementation can yield
performance gains almost as important as the algorithmic optimizations. We
limit our tips to the implementation of rainbow tables.
5.1 Storing the Chain End Points
The number of operations of the trade-off decreases with the square of the avail-
able memory. Since available memory is measured in bytes and not in number
of chains, it is important to choose an efficient format for storing the chains.
A first issue is whether to use inputs or outputs of the function to be inverted
(keys or ciphertexts) as beginning and end of chains. In practice the keys are
usually smaller than the ciphertexts. It is thus more efficient to store keys (the
key at the end of the chain has no real function but the extra reduction needed
to generate it from the last ciphertext is well worth the saved memory). A second
and more important issue is that we can take advantage of the way the tables
are organized. Indeed a table consists of pairs of beginnings and ends of chains.
To facilitate look-ups the chains are sorted by increasing values of the chain
ends. Since the ends are sorted, successive ends often have an identical prefix.
As suggested in [3] we can thus remove a certain length of prefix and replace it
by an index table that indicates where every prefix starts in the table.
In our Windows password example, there are about 237 keys of 56 bits.
Instead of storing the 56 bits, we store a 37 bit index. From this index we take
21 bits as prefix and store only the last 16 bits in memory. We also store a table
with 221 entries that point to the corresponding suffixes for each possible prefix.
5.2 Storing the Chain Starting Points
The set of keys used for generating all the chains is usually smaller that the total
set of keys. Since rainbow tables allow us to choose the starting points, we can
use keys with increasing value of their index. In our example we used about 300
million starting points. This value can be expressed in 29 bits, so we only need
to store the 29 lower bits of the index. The total amount of memory needed to
store a chain is thus 29+16 bits for the start and the end. The table that relates
the prefixes to the suffixes incurs about 3.5 bits per chain. Altogether we thus
need 49 bits per chain. A simple implementation that stores the full 56 bits of
the start and end chain would need 2.25 times more memory and be 5 times
slower.
5.3 Storing the Checkpoints
For reasons of efficiency of memory access it may in some implementations be
more efficient to store the start and the end of a chain (that is, its suffix) in
multiples of 8 bits. If the size of some parameters does not exactly match the
size of the memory units, the spare bits can be used to store checkpoints for free.
In our case, the 29 bits of the chain start are stored in a 32 bit word, leaving 3
bits available for checkpoints.
6 Conclusion
We have introduced a new optimization for cryptanalytic time-memory trade-offs
which performs much better than the usual T ∝ N2/M2. Our method works by
reducing the work due to false alarms. Since this work is only a part of the total
work our method can not reduce the work indefinitely. Besides having better
performance, checkpoints can be generated almost for free while generating the
trade-off tables. There is thus no indication for not using checkpoints and we
conjecture that they will be used in many future implementations of the trade-
off. Also, checkpoints are a new concept in time-memory trade-offs and they
may lead to further optimizations and applications. In order to analyze the
gain due to checkpoints we have presented a complete analysis of the rainbow
tables. Using this analysis we are able to predict the gain that can be achieved
with checkpoints. Finally we have also presented a simple way of comparing the
existing variants of the trade-off with a so-called trade-off characteristic. We have
calculated this characteristic for rainbow tables and measured it for the other
variants. The results show that rainbow tables outperform the other variants
in all cases except when table look-ups are free and the success probability is
below 80%. The fact that the cryptanalysis time decreases with the square of
the number of elements stored in memory indicates that it is very important to
reduce the memory usage. This is why we have shared our tips on how this can
be achieved in practice.
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